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The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and European Aviation Safety Agency 
(EASA) have recently established new light aircraft certification rules that introduce 
significant changes to the current regulations. The changes include moving from prescriptive 
design requirements to performance-based standards, transferring many of the acceptable 
means of compliance out of the rules and into consensus standards. In addition, the 
FAA/EASA rules change the performance requirements associated with some of the more 
salient safety issues regarding light aircraft. One significant change is the elimination of spin 
recovery demonstration. The new rules now call for enhanced stall warning and aircraft 
handling characteristics that demonstrate resistance to inadvertent departure from 
controlled flight. The means of compliance with these changes in a safe, cost-effective 
manner is a challenging problem. This paper discusses existing approaches to reducing the 
likelihood of departure from controlled flight and introduces a new approach, dubbed 
Departure Aversion, which allows applicants to tailor the amount of departure resistance, 
stall warning, and enhanced safety equipment to meet the new proposed rules. The 
Departure Aversion approach gives applicants the freedom to select the most cost-effective 
portfolio for their design, while meeting the safety intent of the new rules, by ensuring that 
any combination of the selected approaches will be at a higher equivalent level of safety than 
today’s status quo. 
I. Introduction 
In March of 2016, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) 
to revise Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), including Part 23, which contains the airworthiness 
standards for normal, utility, acrobatic, and commuter category airplanes (with no more than 19 passengers and a 
takeoff weight of less than 19,000 pounds).1 Similarly, and in the spirit of harmonization of regulations between 
Europe and the United States, the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) released a Notice of Proposed 
Amendment (NPA) to Certification Specification 23 (CS-23) on 23 June 2016.2 These proposals have been adopted 
in 14 CFR Part 23 Amendment 64 and CS-23 Amendment 5, both of which will be implemented in August 2017. 
The NPRM and NPA proposed significant changes from the current Part 23/CS-23 rule language, in an effort to 
move from what were viewed as prescriptive design requirements to performance-based airworthiness standards. 
This change was designed to maintain the equivalent level of safety of the current Part 23/CS-23 fleet, with 
enhancements to perceived high-risk areas not sufficiently addressed by current rules, namely: certification for flight 
into icing conditions, enhanced stall characteristics, and minimum control speeds for multiengine aircraft. The 
change to performance-based standards was seen as a way to encourage adoption of new, safety-enhancing 
technologies that were slow to be adopted to Part 23/CS-23 due to the lengthy rulemaking process. The use of 
consensus standards as a means of compliance is encouraged by the NPRM and NPA (and the activities that led to 
the NPRM/NPA). In response, ASTM International formed Committee F44 on General Aviation3 to develop 
standards that could be an acceptable means of compliance to the proposed new rules in Part 23/CS-23.  
A. Changes to Low-Speed Flight Characteristics Rules 
The Part 23 NPRM preamble includes “enhanced stall characteristics” as a targeted area for safety improvement. 
This is in response to a number of studies, including data gathered from the Aircraft Owners and Pilot’s Association 
Air Safety Foundation4 and the Joint General Aviation Steering Committee,5 which found that Loss of Control 
(LOC) is one of the leading causes of fatal accidents for light aircraft. The NPRM1 states: 
                                                          
1 Aerospace Engineer, Aeronautics Systems Analysis Branch, MS 442, AIAA Senior Member. 
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The proposed requirements would also include new enhanced standards for resistance to departure from controlled flight. 
Recognizing that the largest number of fatal accidents for part 23 airplanes results from LOC in flight, the FAA proposes 
to update certification standards to address these risks. LOC happens when an airplane enters a flight regime outside its 
normal flight envelope or performance capabilities and develops into a stall or spin, an event that can surprise the pilot. A 
pilot’s lack of awareness of the state of the airplane in flight and the airplane’s low-speed handling characteristics are the 
main causal factors of LOC accidents. Furthermore, stall and departure accidents are generally fatal because an airplane 
is often too low to the ground for the pilot to recover. Improving safety that reduces stall and LOC accidents would save 
lives. The FAA is therefore proposing new rules for stall characteristics and stall warnings that would result in airplane 
designs more resistant to inadvertently departing controlled flight. 
 
Previously, aircraft certified under Part 23 could depart controlled flight in the form of a spin, if the aircraft 
exhibited acceptable recovery characteristics. The FAA indicates that it no longer believes the design of spin-
capable (but recoverable) aircraft is prudent for aircraft other than those approved for aerobatics. Per the NPRM1: 
The FAA also proposes new requirements in §23.215* for airplane stall characteristics and stall warning that would result 
in airplane designs more resistant to inadvertently stalling and departing controlled flight. These proposed requirements 
would increase the level of safety over the current requirements. At the same time, the FAA proposes to eliminate the 
spin recovery requirement in the current rules for normal category airplanes. The FAA believes the spin recovery 
requirement is unnecessary for normal category airplanes because the vast majority of inadvertent stalls leading to spin 
entry occur below a safe altitude for spin recovery. However, airplanes certificated for aerobatics would still have to meet 
spin recovery requirements. 
 
In the final bid to improve low-speed flight characteristics (and reduce the onset of LOC accidents), the FAA 
proposes enhanced awareness mechanisms when the aircraft is close to stall. The NPRM1 states: 
The FAA also proposes to address pilot stall awareness by requiring warnings that are more effective and by allowing 
new approaches to improve pilot awareness of stall margins. These warnings could be as simple as angle of attack or 
energy awareness presentations, or sophisticated envelope protection systems that add a forward force to the pilot’s 
controls as the airplane speed and attitude approach stall. 
 
Overall, the NPRM consolidates the current regulations of §23.201 and §23.203 (stall characteristics), §23.207 
(stall warning), and §23.221 (spins). The 14 CFR Part 23 Amendment 64 rule language drops many of the 
prescriptive methods and means of compliance and focuses on functional performance characteristics. The 
corresponding new rule, implemented as §23.2150, reads as follows6: 
§ 23.2150 Stall characteristics, stall warning, and spins. 
(a) The airplane must have controllable stall characteristics in straight flight, turning flight, and accelerated turning flight 
with a clear and distinctive stall warning that provides sufficient margin to prevent inadvertent stalling. 
(b) Single-engine airplanes, not certified for aerobatics, must not have a tendency to inadvertently depart controlled 
flight. 
(c) Levels 1 and 2 multiengine airplanes, not certified for aerobatics, must not have a tendency to inadvertently depart 
controlled flight from thrust asymmetry after a critical loss of thrust. 
(d) Airplanes certified for aerobatics must have controllable stall characteristics and the ability to recover within one and 
one-half additional turns after initiation of the first control action from any point in a spin, not exceeding six turns or any 
greater number of turns for which certification is requested, while remaining within the operating limitations of the 
airplane. 
(e) Spin characteristics in airplanes certified for aerobatics must not result in unrecoverable spins— 
(1) With any use of the flight or engine power controls; or 
(2) Due to pilot disorientation or incapacitation. 
  
The term “Level,” as noted in §23.2150(c), refers to the number of passenger seats onboard the aircraft.6 In the 
move towards performance-based standards, the FAA acknowledged that the majority of the risk involved with an 
aircraft involves the passengers onboard the aircraft, with a minimal risk to those not on the aircraft. Hence, “Level” 
(commensurate with “risk level”) is correlated with number of passenger seats. Specifically, §23.2005 drops all but 
the normal category for aircraft, and gives the following “certification levels” associated with the normal category: 
 Level 1 – maximum seating configuration of 0-1 passengers, 
 Level 2 – maximum seating configuration of 2-6 passengers, 
 Level 3 – maximum seating configuration of 7-9 passengers, and 
 Level 4 – maximum seating configuration of 10-19 passengers. 
 
                                                          
* The FAA has renumbered this section to §23.2150 in the final rule. 
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The CS-23 Amendment 5 rule largely mirrors the 14 CFR Part 23 Amendment 64 rule, as a means to achieve 
harmonization for light aircraft certification standards between the FAA and EASA. EASA’s rule for low-speed 
flight characteristics7 states: 
 
CS 23.2150 Stall characteristics, stall warning, and spins 
(a) The aeroplane must have controllable stall characteristics in straight flight, turning flight, and accelerated turning 
flight with a clear and distinctive stall warning that provides sufficient margin to prevent inadvertent stalling. A stall 
warning that is mutable for aerobatic flight phases is acceptable. 
(b) Single-engine aeroplanes, not certified for aerobatics, must not have a tendency to hazardously depart controlled 
flight inadvertently. 
(c) Level-1 and -2 multi-engine aeroplanes, not certified for aerobatics, must not have a tendency to hazardously depart 
controlled flight inadvertently from thrust asymmetry after a critical loss of thrust. 
(d) Aeroplanes certified for aerobatics must have controllable stall characteristics and the ability to recover within one 
and one-half additional turns after initiation of the first control action from any point in a spin, not exceeding six turns or 
any greater number of turns for which certification is requested, while remaining within the operating limitations of the 
aeroplane. 
(e) Aeroplanes intended for aerobatics have the ability to recover from any manoeuvre, without exceeding limitations or 
exhibiting unsafe characteristics 
 
One difference is noted between the FAA’s proposed §23.2150(b) and EASA’s proposed CS-23.2150(b). The 
FAA rule only states that inadvertent departure from controlled flight must be avoided, whereas EASA adds the 
modifier “hazardously” to the departure. It is unclear if this will stay in the final rule released in August, but this 
appears to allow for some degree of allowable departure behavior that is not explicitly called out in the FAA rule. 
B. Development of Consensus Standards 
The use of consensus standards as a means of compliance to performance-based rules was considered acceptable 
to the FAA and EASA for Light Sport Aircraft (LSA),8,9 a particular class of small, simple aircraft with deliberately 
limited capabilities. The means of compliance for LSA airworthiness reside within standards developed by ASTM 
International Committee F37 on Light Sport Aircraft,10,11 a consensus standard organization that includes producers, 
users, and general interest members (including regulators). The experience gained with the LSA structure was used 
to inform changes made to the Part 23/CS-23 structure. The shift towards consensus standards resulted in a dramatic 
reduction in the size of the rule language as compared to the existing rules. However, the prescriptive design 
requirements were not omitted; rather, they have been transferred into consensus standards. These standards can be 
maintained, modified, updated, and improved through a consensus process that includes input from producers, users, 
other general interest members, and regulators. ASTM International formed Committee F44 on General Aviation3 to 
maintain these consensus standards, which will be considered one (but not necessarily the only) means of 
compliance to the performance-based rules. 
The initial role of ASTM F44 was to identify the prescriptive design portions within the existing Part 23/CS-23 
rules and incorporate that information into standards under the jurisdiction of F44. Some cleanup was necessary, 
including harmonizing differences between Part 23 and CS-23 and addressing some known inconsistencies and 
outdated information that had not been dealt with in rulemaking. The committee released a full set of initial 
standards, complete with the former Part 23/CS-23 design guidance that had been stripped out of the rules, to 
coincide with the release of the NPRM. Unfortunately, there is little guidance or equivalency in the old rules with 
respect to what it means to “not have a tendency to depart controlled flight.” With the elimination of departure 
recovery in the new rules (largely through elimination of the one- and three-turn spin recovery requirements for 
Normal and Utility category aircraft), ASTM F44 needs to develop a means of compliance with respect to a 
departure-resistant aircraft instead of a departure-recoverable aircraft. 
Currently, the standard that is used as a means of compliance for the requirements of §23.2150/CS-23.2150 is 
F3180/F3180M-16, Standard Specification for Low-Speed Flight Characteristics of Aeroplanes.12 In the initial 
release of this standard, the committee incorporated what little acceptable guidance existed to date with respect to 
departure-resistant aircraft (namely, those that were not required to demonstrate recovery from spins). Now, the 
committee is moving forward to merge past guidance, flight research, and advances in modern technology to 
develop a standard that results in aircraft that are less likely to depart controlled flight. This Departure Aversion 
approach will allow an applicant to show compliance with the proposed §23.2150/CS-23.2150 via a portfolio of 
methods, which includes aerodynamic means, systems solutions, enhanced pilot engagement, and combinations 
thereof. This paper will summarize past guidance for departure resistance and corresponding flight research 
regarding loss of control, and will present the committee’s latest framework for Departure Aversion. 
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II. Existing Departure-Related Guidance 
Avoiding inadvertent departure from controlled flight has been a vexing issue associated with light aircraft from 
the dawn of aviation to the present. Prior to a previous major overhaul of Part 23 guidance in the 1980s, a number of 
different studies were conducted with respect to stall/spin accidents. The National Transportation Safety Board 
(NTSB) made several recommendations in a 1972 study of stall/spin accidents, including changes to training, 
research into new warning systems and aircraft departure characteristics, and overall awareness and outreach to the 
pilot community.13 A 1977 study by Ellis14 suggested improvements to stall warning systems, aerodynamic features 
and control force limits to change stall behavior, and limiting control force changes due to configuration changes as 
ways to reduce the stall-related accident rate. Ontiveros conducted a limited study of different stall warning devices, 
which found that enhanced stall warning systems (especially tactile feedback) were far more effective at alerting an 
otherwise distracted pilot than the standard aural systems15. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA) investigated the departure characteristics of light aircraft using wind tunnels, subscale aircraft, and full-
scale aircraft. NASA used the results of these investigations to develop aerodynamic features and design rules that 
would cause the aircraft to resist spins in pro-spin situations.16 
A. Regulations 
Certification paths do exist that allow other than spin-recoverable aircraft. The FAA’s 14 CFR Part 23 
Amendment 62,17 §23.221(a)(2) allows an applicant to show that an airplane is spin resistant. This is accomplished 
through a series of “abused stalls,” which are similar to the wings-level, turning, and accelerated stall maneuvers in 
§23.201 and §23.203, but with the directional control (rudder) positioned such that the stalls are entered in an 
uncoordinated fashion (e.g., with sideslip). Additionally, §23.221(a)(2)(ii) includes a number of “sustained control 
abuse” maneuvers, designed to illustrate the tendency (or lack thereof) for the aircraft to depart controlled flight 
when pro-spin controls are held for a period of time. The creation of these criteria involved a decades-long 
cooperative research, technology development, and testing effort that included the FAA, NASA, and the General 
Aviation Manufacturer’s Association (GAMA).16,18 In practice, few aircraft have been designed or certified that can 
meet all of the requirements of this standard. A recent example of an aircraft that is capable of meeting these 
requirements is ICON Aircraft’s A519, though that particular aircraft is not certified under Part 23. 
 EASA’s Certification Specifications for Very Light Aeroplanes (CS-VLA)20 includes a provision under CS-
VLA-221(b) that allows an applicant to show a design is “characteristically incapable of spinning” in lieu of 
conducting spin tests. In this case, the applicant conducts the specified low-speed flight maneuvers at conditions 
with margin over those for which approval is being sought, including flight tests at a higher gross weight, a center of 
gravity aft of the rearmost position, and with reduced elevator and rudder travel vs. what will be approved on the 
design. These criteria are identical to older versions of the FAA’s Part 23, namely, §23.221(d), which was removed 
with the adoption of Amendment 50 of the regulation.21 
B. Consensus Standards 
ASTM Standard F3180/F3180M-1612 contains language meant to comply with the proposed rules in §23.2150 of 
the FAA rule and CS-23.2150 of the EASA rule. However, the first release of this standard only incorporated 
existing means of compliance, with some small changes. Namely, with respect to the clause in §23.2150(b)/CS-
23.2150(b) regarding the significant change in what were formerly spin recovery characteristics, F3180/F3180M 
presents the two existing departure-resistance criteria currently available in the rules: “Alternative 1,” which is the 
spin resistance criteria formerly in §23.221(a)(2), and “Alternative 3,” which is the “characteristically incapable of 
spinning” criteria for a subset of airplanes similar to VLA, adapted from CS-VLA-221(b). In recognition of 
upcoming revisions to the standards, F44 also introduced “Alternative 2” into the standard language, which simply 
states that the applicant may propose a combination of aerodynamic and systems-based protections deemed 
acceptable by the local civil airworthiness authority as a means of compliance for showing resistance to departure. 
Additionally, ASTM Standard F3180/F3180M-16 captures means of compliance related to stalls and stall 
warning, currently codified in §23.201, §23.203, and §23.207 of Part 23 Amendment 62 (and similarly for CS-23 
Amendment 3). The maneuvers specified in §23.201 and §23.203 remain largely unchanged; however, the warning 
requirements in §23.207 have been updated per the NPRM and NPA’s request for enhanced stall warning as part of 
the effort to reduce LOC-related accidents. In particular, for most aircraft, the ASTM standard currently requires 
either a combination of tactile (“stick shaker”) and aural stall warnings, or a progressive series of two aural 
annunciations related to low-speed awareness followed by the stall warning. 
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III. Concepts to Mitigate Accidents Due to Inflight Loss of Control  
Since the creation of ASTM Standard F3180/F3180M-16 and the subsequent publication of the NPRM and 
NPA, comments have been received from the aviation community that the current departure and stall warning 
approaches discussed within the ASTM standard are not adequate. Committee F44 indicated its awareness of this 
issue by putting in the “placeholder” mentioned above, that is, “Alternative 2.” The rationale for Alternative 2 is 
simple: in the decades the two current departure-resistance rules have been in existence (codified as “Alternative 1” 
and “Alternative 3” in F3180/F3180M-16), few aircraft have been designed, much less certified or enjoyed 
commercial success, that fully meet either of these criteria. Several commercially successful designs have been 
created that partially meet these requirements, but these designs have required additional scrutiny through the 
Equivalent Level of Safety (ELOS) process to receive exception from the spin recovery requirements in the existing 
§23.221. Two examples of recent aircraft that use enhanced departure resistance approaches include Columbia 
Aircraft Corporation’s (now Textron Aviation) LC40-550FG22 and Cirrus Design Corporation’s SR20.23 
The challenge, and strength, of consensus standards is that they must balance the needs of the diverse 
stakeholders within the committee, which, done properly, reflect a fair makeup of the community at large. 
Regarding loss of control and proposed means of compliance to the new §23.2150 rule, the consensus standard 
committee must balance issues such as safety goals, cost of compliance, ease of implementation, and reduction of 
ancillary consequences. The stated goal of the overall Part 23 rewrite has often been summarized as “twice the 
safety at half the cost,” though the challenges associated with LOC reduction tend to focus more on the increase in 
safety, with the cost reduction coming from simplification of prescriptive requirements in other areas not directly 
related to LOC. To successfully achieve this balance amongst the stakeholders, ASTM Committee F44 has held a 
number of internal meetings, as well as two Loss of Control workshops in conjunction with some of its face-to-face 
committee meetings, to solicit ideas, approaches, and issues associated with reduction of LOC accidents and 
creation of suitable standards. 
A. Layered Defenses 
One outcome of the Loss of Control workshops was that there is no single “silver bullet” to address LOC 
accidents. Despite the decades of efforts and changes in regulations related to design and training associated with 
LOC, the recurrence of accidents related to stalls and spins remains strikingly persistent: the same factors addressed 
in 197714 continue to show up in today’s accidents,5 with the latter report showing LOC as the leading cause of fatal 
accidents (over 40% of all fatal accidents during the reporting period). Accident data from 20134 indicates that pilot-
related errors in non-commercial, fixed-wing general aviation operations (the type of aircraft largely covered by Part 
23) are a factor in 72.9% of fatal accidents. Assuming that LOC trends similarly with pilot error vs. other causes, 
and considering that “other or unknown” accounts for 18.1% of fatal accidents in this category of aviation, one can 
deduce that mechanical failures account for a very small subset of total aviation accidents. A familiar refrain at the 
workshops was the fact that design standards may only impact a small fraction of the accidents associated with loss 
of control, given that the ASTM Committee’s scope is limited to the aircraft and does not include the pilot. A 
persistent question remained: is the “silver bullet” really in the aircraft design, or does it lie with training? 
James Reason’s article on human error modeling and management places more emphasis on the system in which 
the humans operate, rather than the unsafe actions of an individual.24 He states that targeting reduction in unsafe acts 
directly tends to overlook two common features. First, he states that it is “often the best people who make the worst 
mistakes – error is not the monopoly of an unfortunate few.” The 2013 Nall data4 may be representative here: 
although the number of fatal accidents in commercial fixed-wing aviation is substantially less than for non-
commercial aviation, the relative percentage of pilot-related causal factors for commercial and non-commercial 
remains similar, despite regulations that require more experience and greater demonstrated skill for commercial 
pilots. Second, Reason states, “far from being random, mishaps tend to fall into recurrent patterns. The same set of 
circumstances can provoke similar errors, regardless of the people involved.” This narrative fits well with the 
observed record of LOC accidents – despite decades of study with accompanying improvements in training and 
technology, the same types of accidents are occurring in the same phases of flight. Reason concludes his 
observations of these overlooked features by stating, “The pursuit of greater safety is seriously impeded by an 
approach that does not seek out and remove the error provoking properties within the system at large.” 
Reason’s “Swiss Cheese Model” of system accidents reflects the different types of failures and the roles of 
multiple defenses against such failures. Each “slice” of cheese has holes that represent either active failures – unsafe 
acts committed by people directly in contact with the system, or latent conditions – situations which arise from 
decisions made by designers, builders, procedure writers, and top-level management.24 The number of slices 
represents the number of defenses against a particular hazard, and the holes in the slices represent omissions in a 
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particular defense – either due to active failures or latent conditions. If the slices are arranged such that any set of 
“holes” line up, an “error trajectory” is available that can lead from a hazard to an accident. One adaptation of this 
model is shown in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1. Adaptation of Reason's "Swiss Cheese Model” of human behavior.25 
Reason24 cites trends in human factors research regarding management of unsafe acts; namely, that this can be 
accomplished by limiting the incidence of dangerous errors, and, “since this will never be wholly effective,” 
developing systems that can be tolerant of errors. The latter approach is similar to the concept of fault-tolerance that 
is embraced by developers of high reliability systems, such as modern human-rated spacecraft architectures.26 Here, 
the presence of a single (or multiple) independent faults is assumed, and the system is designed to be able to contain 
these faults and either maintain acceptable performance to continue the mission, or gracefully degrade in such a way 
as to allow for safe return of the crew. Fault containment is achieved by building in multiple defenses (“slices of 
cheese”) and designing the system such that latent conditions (“holes in the cheese”) do not line up with each other. 
Hence, in a fault-tolerant design with enough defenses, any new active failure (single “new hole” poked in any slice 
of cheese) cannot propagate through the system. 
B. Portfolio Approach to Reducing Inflight Loss of Control 
The concept of a layered defense, along with the lack of a single, manageable casual factor, pointed towards an 
approach that enables a portfolio of solutions to solve the LOC problem – allowing an applicant to decrease the 
probability of an LOC-induced accident through a multifaceted, layered application of various techniques. This is 
analogous to the approach used to design for aircraft survivability, where total probability of loss is a combination of 
susceptibility (e.g., being detected, or being hit if detected) and vulnerability (e.g., the damage inflicted by being hit 
results in a loss of the aircraft).27 Different military aircraft use various combinations of approaches (stealth, 
maneuverability, robustness) that result in a reduced probability of loss. 
Similarly, mitigation of LOC events can be considered as a reduction of probability in several key areas. The 
FAA and EASA indicated some areas where improvement must be made in the preamble to the NPRM and NPA. 
These documents focus on ways to increase pilot awareness regarding current aircraft performance state and margins 
above stall, as well as encouraging new approaches for stall warning, which can be thought of as a reduction in 
susceptibility to LOC. They also push for designs that do not depart controlled flight as readily as today’s aircraft in 
situations where a distracted pilot may ignore these warnings. Such an approach can be thought of a reduction in 
vulnerability, since the vehicle is already in a situation where current designs will depart controlled flight. It is 
further interesting that the FAA and EASA note that the current approach to reduce vulnerability to departure – 
namely, the ability to recover from a spin – is not effective since most of the fatal accidents occur at altitudes that do 
not allow for sufficient recovery. Though the FAA and EASA drop the requirement for recovery entirely from the 
rule, this indicates a willingness to accept a departure if recovery could be made in such a way as to be more 
effective in the low-altitude, high-workload situations where LOC accidents are so prevalent today. The regulators 
do not necessarily imply that recovery is unimportant – rather, they state that current methods stipulated by the 
regulations for recovery are insufficient. 
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IV. Departure Aversion  
To build upon the portfolio-based concept for mitigation of loss of control, the committee developed a new 
approach that could score a variety of layered, disparate defenses against LOC. This approach is dubbed Departure 
Aversion, which is defined as “the holistic tendency of the aircraft to resist unintentional departure from controlled 
flight.” It permits varying degrees of increased departure resistance (through aerodynamics and control limitations), 
enhanced stall warning, and other safety-enhancing devices (including new indications, displays, and recovery 
systems). To accomplish this, each approach is reduced to a common currency – “points” – and although different 
paths each have different individual scores, the aggregate score must meet a minimum threshold. In effect, 
Departure Aversion is a generic ELOS process for different LOC mitigation paths, which is built from three 
essential elements: Stall Warning, Departure Resistance, and Safety-Enhancing Equipment. 
The total number of Departure Aversion “points” to require depends on the type of aircraft. The new §23.2150 
rule (language appears earlier in this document) defines different requirements for single vs. multiengine aircraft, 
airworthiness level, approved vs. not approved for aerobatics, or combinations thereof, as follows: 
 All aircraft must comply with §23.2150(a), which requires controllable stall characteristics and 
specifies an enhanced stall warning as compared to the previous rule. 
 All single engine aircraft not certified for aerobatics must meet §23.2150(b), which requires the aircraft 
to not have a tendency to inadvertently depart controlled flight. This clause also eliminates the need to 
demonstrate spin recovery, a key component of the previous rule. 
 All Level 1 and 2 multiengine aircraft not certified for aerobatics must meet §23.2150(c), which 
requires the aircraft to not have a have a tendency to inadvertently depart controlled flight after a 
“critical loss of thrust.” This is a new requirement largely affecting light twin engine aircraft that 
experience rollover accidents at low speed after an engine failure. 
 All aircraft certified for aerobatics must meet §23.2150(d) and §23.2150(e), which define spin and spin 
recovery characteristics largely similar to previous rules. 
A notional flowchart, shown in Figure 2, gives the decision tree for determination of the Departure Aversion 
score, 𝑆𝐷𝐴, required in response to these distinctions. The Departure Aversion score is found from the sum of the 
Stall Warning score, the Departure Resistance Score (if applicable), and the Safety-Enhancing Features score (if 
applicable). As will become apparent in the next few subsections, the point values associated with various options 
and maneuvers are set up to ensure that the overall safety of all aircraft is improved with respect to departure from 
controlled flight, a stipulated goal for the NPRM and NPA. 
 
 
Figure 2. Notional Departure Aversion Score (𝑺𝑫𝑨) requirements tree. 
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A. Stall Warning 
Stall warning systems, and associated requirements, have not changed much in the past few decades. The past 
stall warning regulations were dictated by §23.207, which, besides mandating that the warning be “clear and 
distinctive,” stated that it may be furnished through a system or the “inherent aerodynamic qualities of the airplane.” 
Other than a prohibition on visual devices that “requires the attention of the crew within the cockpit,” §23.207 
otherwise just provides activation criteria. 
 
1. Stall Warning Systems 
As noted earlier in this paper, the FAA and EASA specifically emphasized improved stall warning for LOC 
reduction. Existing stall warning requirements have typically been met through a single aural tone. This tone is often 
activated by a change in suction at the leading edge of the wing, which either changes the position of a switch that 
actuates an electrically-generated sound, or passes air through a pneumatic tube with a calibrated reed. 
The effectiveness of a single aural tone, or multiple aural warnings in general, is a subject of much debate. 
However, direct measurement of the effectiveness of different stall warning systems is more sparse. Ontiveros’ 1969 
study15 investigated the response of five subjects to four different types of stall warning systems: the classic 
continual-tone stall warning horn, an interrupted horn, a tactile “stick shaker,” and a “stick shaker” with an 
integrated interrupted aural tone (“clacker”) type signal. The experiment introduced response to stall warning as 
secondary to the subjects’ primary task in order to evaluate the subjects’ response in a high-workload environment. 
The results indicated that the standard stall warning horn was effective 64% of the time on average, whereas the 
interrupted tone was effective 84% of the time. The tactile “stick shaker” warnings were the most effective; 
averaging 99% effectiveness for the shaker-only system, and effectively 100% for the shaker-clacker arrangement. 
At the time of this publication, ASTM International’s Low-Speed Flight Characteristics Standard 
(F3180/F3180M-16)12 focuses on a few, prescriptive alternatives for stall warning, all of which represent an 
enhancement from today’s requirements. In the future, the committee is moving towards a scoring system that 
assigns point values to different types of warnings. This includes multiple different types of warnings along several 
different sensory paths. A partial listing of candidate stall warning options is listed in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Partial Listing of Stall Warning Options 
Sensory Path Description 
Aural Constant tone 
Aural Interrupted tone 
Aural Synthetic voice 
Tactile Seat vibration 
Tactile Yoke or stick vibration 
Visual Visual indication independent of pilot focus 
Visual Visual indication in primary field of view 
 
2. Scoring 
As evident in the Ontiveros data, today’s classic “horn” system does provide warning for some events, but it is 
not wholly effective. The FAA and EASA goal to “double the safety” can be apportioned to LOC mitigation by 
attempting to double the effectiveness of the status quo in the targeted areas of improvement. Hence, a stall warning 
system that is similar to those installed in today’s aircraft could be considered about half as good as a “perfect” 
system, noting that even a “perfect” system is only effective at warning the pilot of the impending stall – it does not 
actually recover the aircraft. If 100 points is defined as the maximum for the Stall Warning score, 𝑆𝑆𝑊, a traditional 
single horn-type aural system would be worth 50 points. This helps to anchor the other values assigned for the 
different approaches. 
One challenge associated with the systems in Table 1 is the relative evaluation of their effectiveness in the 
context of stall warning. The Ontiveros data provides some reference for the constant tone, interrupted tone, and 
yoke/seat vibration, as well as the effectiveness of an interrupted tone with yoke or stick vibration. Other values 
need to be derived from experience, and eventually, data. Hence, it is prudent to approach these point values 
conservatively and update these values over time as more data becomes available. 
Another challenge associated with this approach is the combination of multiple options that can form an 
aggregate Stall Warning score. Should the effectiveness of the systems be additive? Should credit be given only for 
systems with different sensory paths? Relevant research exists for these types of systems in a variety of contexts, but 
specific research in the context of combined effects on stall warning for many of these options has not been 
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identified at this time. Again, the committee’s approach is to start with conservative methods to score combinations 
of stall warning. In addition to limiting the value associated with adding options for stall warning, the committee is 
considering both a “threshold” and a “cap” for the total Stall Warning score. A “threshold” – a minimum score value 
– is a reaction to §23.2150(a), which states that stall warning must be present in all airplanes. This implies that some 
basic level of stall warning should never be compromised. A “cap” represents an upper limit on the aggregate Stall 
Warning score, which is consistent with the layered defense philosophy associated with Reason’s model of failure. 
For aircraft that have additional requirements in §23.2150 (for example, non-aerobatic single engine airplanes), the 
“cap” ensures that applicants do not place too much emphasis here at the expense of other areas. 
B. Departure Resistance 
The NPRM and NPA, and associated final rules in §23.2150(b), indicate that all single-engine aircraft must not 
have a “tendency” to “inadvertently” depart controlled flight, whereas §23.2150(c) indicates that Level 1 and 2 
multiengine aircraft must not have a tendency to inadvertently depart controlled flight due to a “critical loss of 
thrust.” In both cases, the term “inadvertent” implies that applicants are not required to protect against deliberate 
pilot action that leads to departure, and “tendency” implies that applicants are not required to protect against grossly 
negligent neglect of the controls. 
For single-engine airplanes, the F3180/F3180M-16 standard currently includes three alternatives for compliance 
with §23.2150(b). As discussed earlier, the first alternative is essentially the same as §23.221(a)(2), which is the 
“spin resistance” criteria that exists for all aircraft today. The third alternative, which only applies to Level 1 aircraft, 
is the same criteria that exists for CS-VLA-221(b). In both cases, these alternatives are “all or nothing,” meaning 
that failure of any one condition or maneuver is grounds for failing the entire approach. As such, the flowchart 
shown previously in Figure 2 does not assign a “point” value for departure for paths that use Alternatives 1 or 3. 
 
1. Maneuvers 
Alternative 2, which is currently being developed by the committee, takes a graduated approach compared to the 
all-or-nothing criteria used for the other alternatives. It considers maneuvers with the same intent as the maneuvers 
used to develop the §23.221(a)(2) spin resistance criteria, but with a “point” value assigned to the outcome of each 
maneuver. The total Departure Resistance score, 𝑆𝐷𝑅, for Alternative 2 is the total score of all maneuvers. 
Guidance for the creation of such a maneuver matrix can be found in the extensive research that led to the 
maneuvers defined in §23.221(a)(2), which was developed with NASA, the FAA, and GAMA in the 1980s and 
1990s. In particular, the maneuvers used to demonstrate “spin resistance” included demonstration of: 
 Lateral controllability – maneuvers designed to show that the aircraft can maintain post-stall lateral 
control. These include criteria to maintain wings-level flight within some tolerance, as well as 
demonstrate roll authority with normal control sense. These maneuvers ensure that control power is 
balanced such that normal use of the controls will not induce spins post-stall. 
 Uncoordinated stalls (“abused” stalls) – maneuvers designed to mimic “real-world” scenarios in which 
a distracted pilot does not apply proper coordination of lateral and directional controls (e.g, aileron and 
rudder). These situations can occur power-on (such as during initial climb and go-around) or power-off 
(such as during a base-to-final turn). For these maneuvers, the aircraft is stalled in unaccelerated and 
accelerated turns while uncoordinated, and the pilot must demonstrate post-stall lateral control by 
returning the aircraft to wings-level flight through normal (e.g. unreversed) use of the controls. 
 Sustained control abuse – maneuvers designed to evaluate the tendency of the aircraft to depart 
controlled flight when the controls are not coordinated for a period of time. For these maneuvers, the 
uncoordinated controls are held for several seconds. This enables determination of the amount of time a 
pilot has available between misapplication of controls and departure from controlled flight. 
 
2. Scoring 
For Alternative 2, scoring is commensurate with outcome. “Points” are given for each maneuver if the resistance 
criteria for that class of maneuver are met. The sum of “points” from each successful maneuver then creates the 
Departure Resistance score. Though the actual composition of the maneuver list (called the Alternative 2 Maneuver 
Matrix) is still being debated, many candidates are based on the spin resistance maneuvers listed above. The 
maximum point value for each maneuver is normalized such that successfully meeting all maneuvers would result in 
a Departure Resistance score of 100. Hence, the “point” value, 𝑋𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡 , of each successful maneuver is 100/𝑁𝑀, 
where 𝑁𝑀 is the total number of maneuvers in the Alternative 2 Maneuver Matrix. An aircraft that meets the spin 
resistance criteria in §23.221(a)(2) would get a score of 100, whereas an aircraft that meets the spin resistance 
criteria for some maneuvers, but not all, would have a score of less than 100. 
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This scoring method is consistent with FAA and EASA guidance in that it does not provide any “credit” for 
designs that recover from spins but instead focuses on resisting the departure. One issue with this approach is that 
departure-resistant aircraft tend to be difficult to recover once they depart.18 Additionally, there may be merit to 
provide some, but not full, incentive for recoverable designs. The modern general aviation fleet contains a number 
of different makes and models of aircraft, most of which are designed to today’s spin recovery standards. The fatal 
accident rate of those different types varies greatly. Though dated, Ellis’ 1977 study14 shows the variation in fatal 
accident rate among 31 different makes and models of single-engine aircraft (many of which are still flying in 
today’s fleet). This study indicates that the rate of fatal accidents due to “stall/mush” (which includes spins) varies 
from 0.12 to 3.05 per 100,000 flight hours, with an average of 0.389. Given that these designs were all spin-
recoverable, and not spin-resistant, it is reasonable to conclude that a significant reduction in fatal accident rate can 
still be made in spin-recoverable aircraft. It may be that these aircraft depart, but do so in a slow, deliberate fashion 
that gives the pilot ample time and warning to correct the departure. This is actually one of the key differences 
between the FAA and EASA language at the time of this writing – EASA’s rule states that the aircraft must not “not 
have a tendency to hazardously depart controlled flight inadvertently.” Hence, the committee is considering “partial 
credit” for maneuvers that do not meet the spin resistance criteria, but rather do meet some enhanced recovery 
criteria if the aircraft does depart. 
To anchor the Departure Resistance score, the “threshold” and “cap” method is used, as it was with the Stall 
Warning score. Given that aircraft that require Departure Resistance also require Stall Warning, the limits on the 
Departure Resistance score are commensurate with the limits on the Stall Warning score – both are capped at a 
maximum of 100 points. Also, as with the Stall Warning score, the allocation of the FAA/EASA desire for “twice 
the safety” implies that today’s average aircraft are half as departure-resistant as they need to be to meet the new 
rule and therefore should be able to achieve approximately 50% of this score, or 50 points. This latter stipulation 
helps to anchor the value assigned to the enhanced recovery criteria for maneuvers that do not meet the full 
departure resistance criteria. 
 
3. System-Based Departure Resistance 
The descriptions of the maneuvers used for Alternatives 1 or 2 have largely implied aerodynamic departure 
resistance or recovery, such as the wing cuffs developed under the NASA/FAA/GAMA spin resistance program.16 
However, several aircraft today use active systems to prevent departure, such as “stick pushers.” Several recent 
ELOS findings28,29,30,31 have been issued for modern aircraft using stick pushers that would affect many of the stall 
and departure resistance tests required by §23.2150. The committee intends to continue to allow these systems to be 
used for termination of maneuvers required by Alternative 1 or 2. The current F3180/F3180M-1612 standard states 
that “maneuvers can be discontinued, and a normal recovery initiated, after a downward pitching motion of the 
aeroplane commences due to the activation of a stall avoidance device (for example, stick pusher activation).” 
 
4. Effort vs. Previous Departure-Related Guidance 
Although the NPRM and NPA stated a goal of “twice the safety at half the cost,” the FAA and EASA indicated 
they were willing to accept additional costs of compliance in the areas of stall warning and departure characteristics, 
as long as those costs were offset elsewhere. Spin recovery demonstration is one area of a flight test program that 
typically involves substantial costs, and its elimination could provide significant cost savings. Furthermore, 
according to the NPRM and NPA, it provides a dubious safety benefit. However, if the cost and effort necessary to 
comply with Alternative 1, Alternative 2, or Alternative 3 is prohibitive, the safety benefit may not be realized. 
Given that Alternatives 1 and 3 are essentially the same as departure resistance criteria used in previous rules and 
these alternatives were rarely employed, it stands to reason that they are likely not cost-effective in the current 
market. Approached correctly, this should not be the case with Alternative 2. The maneuvers currently envisioned 
for the Alternative 2 maneuver matrix will result in approximately 70-100 combinations for typical aircraft. This is 
in contrast to several hundred maneuvers used in a typical spin recovery maneuver matrix.32 Although the number of 
maneuvers for Alterative 2 may be similar to Alternative 1, the fact that Alternative 2 uses a continuous score 
metric, rather than a single pass/fail based on completion of all maneuvers, should enable a number of “good” but 
not “perfect” designs to move forward. As an example, the Columbia 300, which completed most of the maneuvers 
successfully for the §23.221(a)(2) spin resistance criteria (now Alternative 1), required an ELOS finding because it 
could not pass all of the maneuvers at all required conditions.33 Under Alternative 2, the Columbia 300 would have a 
high Departure Resistance score, slightly less than 100. Hence, with the addition of a small amount of Safety-
Enhancing Features (see next section), the Columbia 300 would not require an ELOS finding. 
A “hard” threshold at a Departure Resistance score of 50 may also be considered a cost burden. However, the 
committee is considering language that would require (rather than simply allow) a particular class of Safety-
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Enhancing Features (namely, a Descent Arrest System) that meets minimum performance criteria for aircraft with a 
Departure Resistance Score less than 50. This would be similar to the ELOS criteria offered for the Cirrus SR20, 
which required enhanced stall handling characteristics and a ballistic recovery parachute system.34 
 
5. Multiengine Aircraft 
The other major change associated with departure resistance involves §23.2150(c), which is related to the 
departure of the aircraft following a critical loss of thrust. The committee is currently investigating performance-
based and systems-based protection features that enhance the departure resistance of multiengine aircraft following a 
critical loss of thrust. To date, the committee has largely focused on the other areas of §23.2150 and intends to 
develop options to deal with multiengine critical loss of thrust in the near future. 
C. Safety-Enhancing Features 
The Stall Warning score and, if required, Departure Resistance score, enable applicants to achieve less than 
100% compliance with §23.2150(a) and §23.2150(b), respectively. However, if the applicant chooses a path that 
scores less than 100% in either of these areas, they must include Safety-Enhancing Features to increase their 
Departure Aversion Score to the required level. Safety-Enhancing Features is envisioned by the committee as an “a 
la carte” menu of options that applicants may choose to bring up their total Departure Aversion score. Currently, 
three categories of Safety-Enhancing Features are considered: 
 Enhanced Indication Systems – systems intended to provide additional information regarding the low-
speed airplane control and performance state, beyond the requirements of the Flight Instrumentation 
described in ASTM Standard F306135 and the Markings and Placards described in ASTM Standard 
F311736. 
 Enhanced Envelope Awareness Systems – systems intended to provide control feedback when the flight 
crew provides control inputs that place the aircraft in realms that have reduced margin over loss-of-
control. Stall barrier devices (such as stick pushers) and envelope-limiting control systems are not 
considered here; such devices are instead used for compliance with maneuvers associated with 
demonstration of stall and post-stall behavior. In essence, an Enhanced Envelope Awareness System is 
designed to allow the flight crew to override the system without deactivating it; true “full authority” 
systems are designed to override the flight crew control inputs.† 
 Descent Arrest Systems – systems intended to slow the descent of an aircraft that has departed 
controlled flight and place the aircraft in an attitude and at an appropriate velocity such that the 
resulting impact with the ground does not violate the maximum impact loads specified in ASTM 
Standard F3083.37 
 
1. Enhanced Indication Systems 
The Enhanced Indication Systems (EIS) concept relates to the NPRM preamble material noted earlier indicating 
the FAA was interested in “allowing new approaches to improve pilot awareness of stall margins… as simple as 
angle of attack or energy awareness presentations…” as a means to improve low-speed awareness. Current ideas 
under consideration for EIS include: 
 angle-of-attack indication, with additional credit for trend information, 
 angle-of-attack driven pitch limit indication displayed with attitude indication, with additional credit for 
trend information, 
 dynamic low-speed airspeed markings, such as angle-of-attack driven V-speeds on an airspeed tape, 
 airspeed trend information/marker displayed with airspeed, 
 altitude trend information displayed with altitude, 
 flight path marker displayed with attitude indication, and 
 loss of control alert issued when loss of control is likely within trend window. 
 
2. Enhanced Envelope Awareness Systems 
The Enhanced Envelope Awareness Systems (EEAS) concept relates to the NPRM preamble material noted 
earlier indicating the FAA was interested in “…envelope protection systems that add a forward force to the pilot’s 
controls as the airplane speed and attitude approach stall.” As noted earlier, EEAS are not meant to be “full-
                                                          
† There are cases where the flight crew has overpowered “full authority” systems (e.g., Colgan Air flight 304738), but 
such systems are designed to standards that suppose the system will override flight crew inputs. 
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authority” systems, but rather systems that provide control feedback that can be overridden by the flight crew as loss 
of control margins are reduced. This is explained as the “H-Metaphor” in NASA-sponsored research.39 Here, the H-
Metaphor is likened to a rider on a horse – the horse normally goes where the rider commands it, but as threats are 
encountered by the horse (e.g., the horse is directed to ride through a dense patch of thorns), the horse resists the 
rider’s commands. The rider may be able to control the horse towards the threat, but with increased control effort. 
As the threat to the horse increases, so does the resistance of the horse to rider commands. 
Similarly, automatic control systems can provide feedback to the user. Yaw dampers have existed for the rudder 
control for many different aircraft for decades. Many modern aircraft are equipped with two-axis autopilots, and the 
market has seen recent introduction of products that use autopilots as a mechanism to artificially increase stability as 
low-speed control margin is reduced. For example, Garmin® announced in 2015 that it was bringing “Electronic 
Stability and Protection” to systems that utilize the Garmin® autopilot.40 More recently, manufacturers have 
investigated digital engine controls that may result in autothrottle systems coming to the light aircraft market (such 
devices are prevalent in today’s large aircraft market). 
The current working hypothesis for generating “points” for EEAS is to apply a point value to the control axis 
associated with the EEAS systems (pitch, roll, yaw, thrust). Additionally, standards are in development that describe 
the amount of feedback (force) and activation criteria for each of these control axes. 
 
3. Descent Arrest Systems 
Although Descent Arrest Systems (DAS) are not explicitly mentioned in the NPRM or NPA, they have become 
more popular in the market in the form of whole airframe parachutes. The most notable example in the certified 
aircraft market is the Cirrus series of aircraft. In the case of the Cirrus SR20, the airframe parachute was a 
contributing factor in the ELOS decision34 for relief from §23.221. 
As in consideration now, Descent Arrest Systems are largely focused on development of standards for aircraft 
equipped with airframe parachutes, drawing from the ELOS argument for the Cirrus SR20. Namely, the ELOS was 
granted partially on the basis of the altitude loss associated with parachute deployment and aircraft deceleration 
being less than or equal to the altitude loss associated with typical light aircraft spin recoveries. Notably, the altitude 
loss for these systems (and for spin recovery) typically exceeds the altitude of aircraft in a traffic pattern, which is 
where a number of LOC accidents occur. Hence, minimal safety credit is given for DAS that have large altitude loss. 
However, the committee is considering a “sliding scale” to encourage development of DAS concepts that result in 
less altitude loss during deployment to full steady-state operation. Overall, just like the other Safety-Enhancing 
Features, the DAS cannot be the only mechanism in place to mitigate LOC accidents. 
 
4. Scoring 
As with the Stall Warning score and Departure Resistance score, the Safety Enhancing Features score is capped 
to ensure that applicants are required to install multiple layers of defenses, in line with the Reason model of 
protection described earlier. Currently, one proposed idea is to place a “cap” of approximately 40 points each on the 
three categories of Safety-Enhancing Features (EIS, EEAS, and DAS). This means that, theoretically, an applicant 
could make up 120 points with “perfect” systems in all three categories. 
Additionally, the individual point values for each “a la carte” system are much lower than the baseline thresholds 
associated with Stall Warning and Departure Resistance, largely because the efficacy of such systems has not been 
rigorously established as a mitigation for loss of control. As history with these systems evolves, the individual point 
values assigned to various systems may increase. 
Finally, in an effort to retain the value of Non-Required Safety-Enhancing Equipment (NORSEE) currently 
allowed by the FAA,41 the same type of equipment noted as Safety-Enhancing Equipment may continue to be 
installed via NORSEE if it is not used to generate credit for the Departure Aversion Score. The NORSEE policy 
allows for such equipment to be installed if it can be shown to “do no harm” to existing equipment. This is a lower 
bar than would be allowable for the same equipment if it were to be used for credit for the Departure Aversion score, 
since it would make the equipment “required” for compliance with §23.2150. 
D. Notional Implementation 
To illustrate how the Departure Aversion approach might be used, a few notional aircraft are brought through the 
process. These notional aircraft are based on the four aircraft tested as part of NASA’s spin resistance program. 
These aircraft were representative of types of aircraft produced in the United States at the time, but were 
individually modified for use as test aircraft by NASA. These modifications included accommodations for test 
equipment, and later changes to incorporate spin-resistance technology concepts. Initially, however, these aircraft 
were tested with no spin-resistance technologies incorporated, in particular to establish the spin tendency of the 
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aircraft with pro-spin controls. The four experimental aircraft are described in Table 2. Note that the aircraft 
designations, while similar to aircraft manufactured at that time, are all appended with “X” to denote that these were 
experimental modifications of aircraft. The number of passengers is listed instead of number of seats, since the 
number of passengers is used to define the “Level” that would be assigned in today’s §23.2005 (all aircraft have an 
additional seat for the minimum flight crew – in these cases, one pilot). Spin entry frequency of the original aircraft 
prior to spin-resistance modification is shown as “Orig. Spin Frequency,” and spin entry frequency after the 
application of the spin reduction technology is shown as “Mod. Spin Frequency.”  The Departure Aversion points 
requirement is based on Figure 2, assuming all aircraft use Alternative 2 to meet §23.2150(b). 
 
Table 2. Experimental Aircraft Used in NASA Spin Resistance Testing (adapted from Ref. 16) 
 
    
Designation AA-1X C-23X PA-28RX C-172X 
Orig. Spin Frequency  96% 98% 83% 59% 
Mod. Spin Frequency 0% 5% 5% 0% 
No. of Passengers 1 3 3 3 
§23.2005 Level 1 2 2 2 
𝑺𝑫𝑨 “Points” Req’d 150 200 200 200 
 
To determine the Departure Aversion score of these aircraft in an unmodified state, it is necessary to assign point 
values to various features associated with Stall Warning, as well as to maneuvers associated with the Alternative 2 
Maneuver Matrix. Notional point values for different Stall Warning systems, based on the options from Table 1, are 
given below in Table 3. Note that this scoring system assumes that any system beyond the first system gets only half 
credit, and, as mentioned earlier, the total available score is capped at 100. Also, for now, this analysis will assume 
that only one system of a given sensory path can be installed (e.g., no credit for constant tone + synthetic voice). 
 
Table 3. Notional Stall Warning Score for Various Stall Warning Systems 
Sensory Path Description Points 
Aural Constant tone 50 
Aural Interrupted tone 60 
Aural Synthetic voice 70 
Tactile Seat vibration 50 
Tactile Yoke or stick vibration 90 
Visual Visual indication independent of pilot focus 25 
Visual Visual indication in primary field of view 10 
(All) Credit for each system beyond first system installed 50% 
(All) Maximum score (no matter how many installed) 100 
 
The types of maneuvers discussed in Section IV.B of this paper can help determine the number of maneuvers in 
the Alternative 2 Maneuver Matrix. Assumptions are that all aircraft have three flap positions (clean, intermediate, 
and full), aircraft with retractable gear (PA-28RX) are tested with gear down in all but the flaps clean configuration, 
and the configurations are tested power-on and power-off at the most adverse CG position and weight. The 
uncoordinated maneuvers are conducted in left and right turns, with the ball inside and outside of the turn. The 
sustained control abuse maneuvers include both neutral aileron and aileron opposite to the rudder. With these 
assumptions, the total number of maneuvers for these aircraft is 𝑁𝑀 = 90. This results in 𝑋𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 100 90⁄ = 1.11 
per maneuver. If the aircraft cannot pass the resistance criteria, but can recover from the ensuing departure, it 
receives 1/3 the credit, resulting in a “point” value for enhanced recovery 𝑋𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑣 = 1.11 3⁄ = 0.37 per maneuver. 
Note that these are very similar to the maneuvers required by §23.221(a)(2), though the degree of sustained control 
above may be tailored such that these are not full spin-entry inputs, but rather a modified forward slip during stall 
for the opposite ailerons. A summary of the notional maneuver categories is given in Table 4. 
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Table 4. Notional Summary of Alternative 2 Maneuver Matrix 
Maneuver Type Number 
Power-off, coordinated lateral controllability 3 
Power-on, coordinated lateral controllability 3 
Power-off, wings-level uncoordinated stalls 6 
Power-on, wings-level uncoordinated stalls 6 
Power-off, turning uncoordinated stalls 12 
Power-on, turning uncoordinated stalls 12 
Power-off, accelerated turning uncoordinated stalls 12 
Power-on, accelerated turning uncoordinated stalls 12 
Power-off, sustained control abuse, neutral aileron 6 
Power-on, sustained control abuse, neutral aileron 6 
Power-off, sustained control abuse, opposite aileron 6 
Power-on, sustained control abuse, opposite aileron 6 
Total 90 
 
All of the unmodified aircraft are assumed to have a traditional single-tone stall warning horn, for a stall warning 
score of 𝑆𝑊 = 50 per Table 3. Though it is difficult to make an assumption regarding the disposition of maneuvers 
for each unmodified aircraft, a number of assumptions are made for the sake of an initial evaluation. First, the 
unmodified aircraft are assumed to be able to meet the full resistance criteria for the six coordinated lateral 
controllability maneuvers, given that these are slight enhancements to the controllability demonstrations seen in the 
variant of 23.201 that was in force when these aircraft were certified. The unmodified aircraft are otherwise assumed 
to resist the remaining 84 maneuvers according to the complement of spin frequency rate (e.g, 1 − 𝑓𝑠). A final 
assumption is made that the maneuvers that result in a departure all result in a recovery to the enhanced spin 
recovery criteria, which may be optimistic. Hence, the Departure Resistance Score will be: 𝑆𝐷𝑅 = [6 + (1 −
𝑓𝑠)]𝑋𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 84𝑓𝑠𝑋𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑣 , where 𝑓𝑠 is the Spin Frequency from Table 2. Under this notional system, the aircraft 
described in Table 2 will achieve the scores shown in Table 5. 
 
Table 5. Notional Scores of Aircraft Used for NASA Spin Resistance Program 
Aircraft AA-1X C-23X PA-28RX C-172X 
𝑺𝑾 50 50 50 50 
𝑺𝑫𝑹, original 38.7 38.8 49.0 59.1 
𝑺𝑫𝑹, with modifications 100.0 92.6 92.6 100.0 
𝑺𝑫𝑨, original 88.7/150 req’d 88.8/200 req’d 99.0/200 req’d 109.1/200 req’d 
𝑺𝑫𝑨, with modifications 150.0/150 req’d 142.6/200 req’d 142.6/200 req’d 150/200 req’d 
 
Per these estimates, none of the unmodified aircraft would meet the Departure Aversion criteria, and the 
modified AA-1X tested by NASA with the spin resistance modifications (leading edge cuffs) would just barely meet 
the criteria (note that this is a Level 1 aircraft, so it has a lower score requirement). Also, the average Stall Warning 
score for all aircraft is 50, and the average Departure Resistance score is 46.4. Both of these values are close to the 
desire to have today’s status quo be around 50 points for both categories. 
The unmodified aircraft have a Departure Aversion score deficit ranging from 61.3 to 111.2, and the spin-
resistant aircraft have a deficit ranging from 0.0 to 80.6. In all cases, up to 50 additional points could be added by 
installing better stall warning systems. If the horn in all aircraft were augmented with a stick shaker, then, per the 
rules in Table 3, each aircraft would receive a maximum score for Stall Warning (90 points for the tactile yoke or 
stick vibration, plus 50 ×½ = 25 points for the aural constant tone, capped at 100 per the notional rules). 
Eliminating the horn and installing a synthetic voice system along with some sort of cockpit-mounted visual 
indication would yield 75 points (70 + 10 ×½). The specific combination is up to the applicant and likely guided 
by cost and ease of installation. Assuming that most applicants select a path that brings 𝑆𝑆𝑊 to 100, the Departure 
Aversion score deficit would range from 11.3 to 61.2 for the aircraft without the NASA spin resistance features, and 
0 to 7.4 points for the aircraft with these features. This deficit is well within the upper limits of the envisioned point 
values for the Safety-Enhancing Features (capped at 40 for EIS, 40 for EAS, and 40 for DAS, noting that DAS 
would likely be substantially lower with today’s technology). For example, if each applicant installed EIS systems 
that included dynamic airspeed markings at a notional 10 points and an angle-of-attack indicator at a notional 5 
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points, they would have an EIS score of 15. An additional notional 10 points per control axis of an EEAS would 
bring 20 points for a two-axis autopilot that used an H-Metaphor approach for control feedback. This brings the 
combined Safety Enhancing Features score to 35 points, which would be nearly enough for several of the 
unmodified aircraft with better Stall Warning. 
These notional results do not indicate that applicants would be forced to add the NASA spin resistance 
technology to their aircraft, at least not to the same extremes as applied to the example aircraft. For example, the 
Columbia 300, referenced earlier, would have a very high Departure Resistance Score, though it would not reach a 
full 100 points in this area. With increased stall warning, and a modest increase in Enhanced Indication, such an 
aircraft would likely reach the 200-point threshold required for non-aerobatic, single-engine Level 2 aircraft. 
V. Conclusions 
Inflight loss of control is a vexing problem that has remained a consistent accident category for light aircraft for 
decades. Recent changes to the certification rules for light aircraft, namely 14 CFR Part 23 in the United States and 
CS-23 in Europe, have targeted this category of accidents by requiring enhanced stall warning and post-stall 
characteristics. These rule changes also recognize that the requirement for demonstration of spin recovery in 
certification programs does not provide a benefit commensurate with the associated cost. In most cases, departure 
from controlled flight occurs at altitudes that preclude proper recovery action. The FAA and EASA guidance shifts 
the focus from recovery towards (1) providing the pilot with greater warning for an impending LOC situation, and 
(2) providing controllability for more time after a stall to allow a pilot to take proper action prior to a full departure. 
At the same time, the revised certification rules have moved away from prescriptive requirements and towards 
performance-based standards. In so doing, the FAA and EASA are enabling a faster adoption of new technologies, 
along with a more flexible approach for establishing means of compliance. This allows consensus organizations, 
such as ASTM International Committee F44 on General Aviation, to develop means of compliance that meet the 
performance-based intent of the certification rules in a way that is responsive and flexible to their members (who 
represent regulators, users, and producers). 
As part of this effort, a new method is being developed to respond to the new FAA and EASA rules regarding 
departure from controlled flight. This approach, dubbed Departure Aversion, uses a point-based scale that allows for 
multiple combinations of options, while retaining the core desires of the regulators to increase requirements in the 
area of stall warning and handling characteristics in departure-prone situations. Departure Aversion uses a layered 
approach that assumes that faults will continue to occur, and that the system is able to catch these faults prior to 
becoming accidents through multiple, different defenses. This is similar to the design of high-reliability systems. 
The Departure Aversion approach focuses on the key areas of Stall Warning and Departure Resistance by 
leveraging data from FAA and NASA research programs on stalls, spins, and spin resistance. However, it does not 
specify a pure pass/fail based maneuver system, but rather it allows for “corners of the envelope” to remain 
uncovered if the overall, holistic aversion to departure from controlled flight is increased. By placing upper and 
lower limits on points for individual contributing factors, Departure Aversion forces a layered defense. 
Furthermore, the Departure Aversion approach seizes on recent technology developments in Safety-Enhancing 
Features. Previously, such equipment would only be installed in experimental category aircraft, or through NORSEE 
provisions. Now, it is possible to get “certification credit” for §23.2150 through the Departure Aversion approach 
for these types of systems. They are not required, but if necessary, they can be used by an applicant. 
Though the committee is still balloting the details of the Departure Aversion approach, a notional, but plausible, 
set of “point” values was devised by the author and compared to aircraft tested as part of the NASA/FAA/GAMA 
spin resistance programs in the 1980s. The result of this analysis showed that the aircraft tested as part of that 
exercise were indeed deficient in terms of meeting the new standard, but they each had plausible paths to meet the 
new standard. This shows that the safety goals are likely achievable using the Departure Aversion approach, without 
a prohibitive cost or effort increment. Furthermore, by allowing multiple different paths to compliance, applicants 
can select the most cost-effective approach, rather than following one or a few prescribed mechanisms. 
There is much work that still needs to be done. Multiple different mechanisms are being debated amongst the 
consensus standards committees today regarding compliance with FAA and EASA rules for stall warning and 
departure characteristics, and usable standards will be necessary by the time the new rules become active in August 
2017. More effort will be needed to help craft the standards that address these rules, and they will be far from 
perfect. As manufacturers develop solutions, preferred routes and potential “loopholes” will likely be discovered. 
These must be addressed systematically, with data from relevant research programs and applications. The various 
systems described in this paper are excellent candidates for future investigation in the context of LOC mitigation, 
and this represents a ripe area of research for improved aviation safety. 
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